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DATELINE MAY 2020
Ralph C. Nash
Is it possible that 2020 will be remembered as the year when college gradu-
ates recognized that Government service is one of the best careers available and
opted to apply for Government jobs? We’ve had several decades of politicians
denigrating Government employees—culminating in the current crescendo. The
result has been that only 7% of the employees of the Federal Government are
under the age of 30. Yet change may be on the horizon.
In the last few months we have seen career employees come to the fore in
guiding the response to the COVID 19 pandemic. We have seen career foreign
services officers risk their careers telling the truth to congressional committees.
At the state and local level, we have seen heroic actions of Government workers
risking their lives to perform their duties. It has been inspiring but it also has
provided a great example of the value of public service—both to the society at
large and to the individuals that have chosen these careers.
We have also seen some agencies fail but that only magnifies the need to at-
tract talented people to work for the Government. The response to the pandemic
has illustrated the importance of highly competent Government at all levels and
that means highly competent people.
I can testify to the fact that Government service is both worthwhile and
challenging. I went to work in the Navy Department right out of Princeton. I
was quickly given a level of responsibility in negotiating contracts that I would
never have been given in any private organization. I learned about the business
of Government contracting at an accelerated pace and it was a great
experience.The same opportunity is available to young college graduates today.
They have seen exemplary performance by Government employees. But they
need to be told of the benefits of Government service. Let’s all make it our job
to spread the word. Governments at all levels in the United States perform vital
and challenging functions and to perform these functions well they need highly
competent employees. That means challenging jobs for young people. It’s a
win-win proposition. RCN
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ment written SOW.…SOOs are normally in the 2–4 page range.…The key is to keep the SOO clear and concise and to provide
potential offerors with enough information and detail to structure a sound program, designed to be executable and satisfy government
objectives.
The JEDI acquisition is for commercial services that are already being provided to governmental and nongovernmental
customers, and descriptions of those services are available from the providers and third parties. Nevertheless, the JEDI “SOO”
is 20 pages long, and offerors had to write “detailed” PWSs. If the DOD could reduce a statement of work for the production
of a weapon system from 137 pages to a two-page SOO in the late 1990s, why, after two decades of acquisition innovation and
streamlining, did it need a 20-page SOO for a commercial item, and why did it need a PWS for a commercial item task order
contract?
A practical person might reasonably argue that the JEDI RFP did not need a 20-page SOO, and the JEDI contract does not
need a PWS. All the RFP needed was a short (two or three pages at the most) statement of “the general scope, nature, complex-
ity, and purpose of the…services” to be ordered, which would be incorporated into the contract in accordance with FAR
16.504(a)(4)(iii). The time to use a SOO would be when issuing a task order, for which the contractor could develop a work
statement for review and approval by the customer prior to task order price negotiation.
The DOD could have prepared a concise statement of the contract scope and general requirements and asked each offeror’s
chief executive officer to sign each and every page, thereby acknowledging the content, assenting to it, and promising that the
company would comply as required by properly issued task orders. The signed statement could have been evaluated as accept-
able or unacceptable based on whether the offeror’s CEO complied, and the winner’s signed statement could have been
incorporated into the contract. That would have been easier on the offerors and the evaluation team, and it would have
preserved the adaptability of the single-award task order scheme.
Conclusion
Why make solicitation preparation, proposal preparation, proposal evaluation, and contract management more complicated
than they need to be by misusing the SOO concept and requiring offerors to write a “detailed” PWS that will serve no essential
or lasting contractual purpose? And why risk wasting time and making evaluation mistakes by giving evaluators unnecessary
work to do? Why incorporate the successful offeror’s PWS into the contract, thereby making the contract less readily adapt-
able, when task orders will describe the Government’s actual requirements and specify the contractor’s actual obligations? The
complexity of a solicitation, proposal, source selection process, or contract are not, of necessity, functions of the amount of
money to be spent, and a complex process and deal are not necessarily better than simple ones. Why do anything when
conducting an acquisition that you don’t have to do and that will be of little practical use when you want to make decisions at
“mission speed”?
The DOD wrote one of the most needlessly complicated and demanding solicitations we have ever seen in order to choose a
contractor to provide a commercial service under a task order contract. We do not doubt that DOD’s team honestly believed
that they needed a PWS and that such a document would be useful, but we do not understand why they believed it. Contractu-
ally, it makes no sense. The JEDI acquisition team essentially discarded key advantages of the commercial item and single-
award task order contract acquisition innovations authorized by Congress. We wonder why somebody in DOD didn’t ask
them: Why the heck are you doing those things? VJE
¶ 26 POSTSCRIPT II: ENHANCED DEBRIEFINGS
Steven L. Schooner
Supplementing my recent discussion, Enhanced Debriefings: A Toothless Mandate?, 34 NCRNL ¶ 10, Vern, in his Postscript
at 34 NCRNL ¶ 21, asked the fundamental question: to the extent “that debriefings should be ‘meaningful,’…what does that
mean?” Vern emphasized the important point that “the reason for debriefing an unsuccessful offeror is to satisfy the curiosity
of a firm that has spent time, energy, money, and yes, emotion, preparing a proposal and enduring the Government’s acquisi-
tion process for months or even years. An offeror’s reason for asking for a debriefing and the use to which it intends to put the
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69K 2020 Thomson Reutersinformation it receives are its own business.” Vern also added helpful and informative history and addressed the more complexissues related to creativity in proposal preparation, the nature of judgment in source selection, and the realities inherent in
protests (the adversarial byproduct of many debriefings). He offered the sobering observation that “none of the guidance or
regulations that we have reviewed, from past to present, instruct agencies to answer the three questions to which many unsuc-
cessful offerors will want ‘reasonable’ responses: (1) specifically, and in detail, how were we different from the winner?, (2)
spec fically, and in detail, how was the winner better?, and (3) specifically, and in detail, how did you reason from what
premises t those conclu ions?” Ultimately, Vern reminded the REPORT’S readers of his prior recommendation in Protest
Reform: We Dare To Dream, 27 NCRNL ¶ 51, which seems conceptually and pragmatically aligned with the enhanced
debriefing initiative, legislation, and policy, that agencies “retain and, during discussions and at the time of debriefing, give of-
ferors copies of all documentation of the evaluations of their own proposals, including the work papers and notes of individual
evaluators, properly collated. Every scrap of paper.” They also should “produce and distribute at the time of debriefing a chart
showing the top-level summary proposal ratings of all offerors and their proposed prices.” That makes sense.
Added Perspective: The DOD IG Report
On April 13, 2020, the Department of Defense Inspector General issued its lengthy report on the JEDI procurement report.
DODIG-2020-079, Report on the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) Cloud Procurement, https://www.dodig.mil/
reports.html/Article/2150471/report-on-the-joint-enterprise-defense-infrastructure-jedi-cloud-procurement-do/. At 313 pages,
and chock-full of conclusions that I expect will satisfy no one, it’s an extraordinary read. Veteran observer Jason Miller
opined: “By now Dana Deasy, the DoD [Chief Information Officer], or David Norquist, the DoD deputy secretary, should be
able to see that the time for JEDI has passed and the Pentagon should cut its losses and cancel the contract.” Time for DoD To
Cancel JEDI, Ride the CIA’s Cloud Coattails, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Apr. 13, 2020), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/reporters-
notebook-jason-miller/2020/04/time-for-dod-to-cancel-jedi-ride-the-cias-cloud-coattails/. He’s not alone in his perception.
Th bulk of the media coverage of the report focused on the potential impact of presidential pressure to derail an award to
Amazo , leading to this seemingly inconsistent conclusion:
We sought to review whether there was any White House influence on the JEDI cloud procurement. We could not review this matter
fully because of the assertion of a “presidential communications privilege,” which resulted in several DoD witnesses being instructed by
the DoD Office of General Counsel not to answer our questions about potential communications between White House and DoD of-
ficials about JEDI. Therefore, we could not definitively determine the full extent or nature of interactions that administration officials
had, or may have had, with senior DoD officials regarding the JEDI Cloud procurement.
* * *
…[Nonetheless,] we believe the evidence we received showed that the DoD personnel who evaluated the contract proposals and
awarded Microsoft the JEDI Cloud contract were not pressured regarding their decision on the award of the contract by any DoD lead-
ers more senior to them, who may have communicated with the White House. [Emphasis added.]
DOD IG Report at 6–7. The IG also rehashes the litany of improper conflicts of interest that Judge Eric Bruggink chronicled
during the prior U.S. Court of Federal Claims protest, Oracle America, Inc. v. U.S., 144 Fed. Cl. 88 (2019), 61 GC ¶ 230. Not
surprisingly, Deap Ubhi, the former Product Manager for the Defense Digital Service, garners the most attention (consuming
approximately 10% of the lengthy report) and some of the most extensive redactions, leading to the IG’s conclusion that (1)
“Mr. Ubhi committed ethical violations when he lied, or failed to disclose information, on at least three occasions, in an effort
to conceal relevant information from, or mislead, his Amazon and DoD supervisors and DoD [Standards of Conduct Office]
officials”; (2) “[t]hese actions, combined with his involvement in early Cloud Initiative activities in… 2017, also created the
appearance of violation of laws and ethical standards”; and (3) “[alas, because] Mr. Ubhi left the DoD on November 24,
2017,…disciplinary action regarding his misconduct is not available to the DoD.” DOD IG Report at 152, 157. But, while
most JEDI procurement aficionados were already familiar with Mr. Ubhi’s exploits and evasions, the report’s most surprising
twist was that there are even more conflicts! For example, the DOD IG Report at 10, 222 states:
Ms. Cummings, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition Enablers, violated her ethical requirements by improperly participating in a particular matter related to the JEDI procure-
ment while owning stock in Microsoft valued between $15,001 and $50,000.…[S]he participated and made recommendations in meet-
ings and briefings where participants evaluated options for either making substantive changes to the procurement or continuing as
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information it receives are its own business.” Vern also added helpful and informative history and addressed the more complex
issues related to creativity in proposal preparation, the nature of judgment in source selection, and the realities inherent in
protests (the adversarial byproduct of many debriefings). He offered the sobering observation that “none of the guidance or
regulations that we have reviewed, from past to present, instruct agencies to answer the three questions to which many unsuc-
cessful offerors will want ‘reasonable’ responses: (1) specifically, and in detail, how were we different from the winner?, (2)
specifically, and in detail, how was the winner better?, and (3) specifically, and in detail, how did you reason from what
premises to those conclusions?” Ultimately, Vern reminded the REPORT’S readers of his prior recommendation in Protest
Reform: We Dare To Dream, 27 NCRNL ¶ 51, which seems conceptually and pragmatically aligned with the enhanced
debriefing initiative, legislation, and policy, that agencies “retain and, during discussions and at the time of debriefing, give of-
ferors copies of all documentation of the evaluations of their own proposals, including the work papers and notes of individual
evaluators, properly collated. Every scrap of paper.” They also should “produce and distribute at the time of debriefing a chart
showing the top-level summary proposal ratings of all offerors and their proposed prices.” That makes sense.
Added Perspective: The DOD IG Report
On April 13, 2020, the Department of Defense Inspector General issued its lengthy report on the JEDI procurement report.
DODIG-2020-079, Report on the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) Cloud Procurement, https://www.dodig.mil/
reports.html/Article/2150471/report-on-the-joint-enterprise-defense-infrastructure-jedi-cloud-procurement-do/. At 313 pages,
and chock-full of conclusions that I expect will satisfy no one, it’s an extraordinary read. Veteran observer Jason Miller
opined: “By now Dana Deasy, the DoD [Chief Information Officer], or David Norquist, the DoD deputy secretary, should be
able to see that the time for JEDI has passed and the Pentagon should cut its losses and cancel the contract.” Time for DoD To
Cancel JEDI, Ride the CIA’s Cloud Coattails, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Apr. 13, 2020), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/reporters-
notebook-jason-miller/2020/04/time-for-dod-to-cancel-jedi-ride-the-cias-cloud-coattails/. He’s not alone in his perception.
The bulk of the media coverage of the report focused on the potential impact of presidential pressure to derail an award to
Amazon, leading to this seemingly inconsistent conclusion:
We sought to review whether there was any White House influence on the JEDI cloud procurement. We could not review this matter
fully because of the assertion of a “presidential communications privilege,” which resulted in several DoD witnesses being instructed by
the DoD Office of General Counsel not to answer our questions about potential communications between White House and DoD of-
ficials about JEDI. Therefore, we could not definitively determine the full extent or nature of interactions that administration officials
had, or may have had, with senior DoD officials regarding the JEDI Cloud procurement.
* * *
…[Nonetheless,] we believe the evidence we received showed that the DoD personnel who evaluated the contract proposals and
awarded Microsoft the JEDI Cloud contract were not pressured regarding their decision on the award of the contract by any DoD lead-
ers more senior to them, who may have communicated with the White House. [Emphasis added.]
DOD IG Report at 6–7. The IG also rehashes the litany of improper conflicts of interest that Judge Eric Bruggink chronicled
during the prior U.S. Court of Federal Claims protest, Oracle America, Inc. v. U.S., 144 Fed. Cl. 88 (2019), 61 GC ¶ 230. Not
surprisingly, Deap Ubhi, the former Product Manager for the Defense Digital Service, garners the most attention (consuming
approximately 10% of the lengthy report) and some of the most extensive redactions, leading to the IG’s conclusion that (1)
“Mr. Ubhi committed ethical violations when he lied, or failed to disclose information, on at least three occasions, in an effort
to conceal relevant information from, or mislead, his Amazon and DoD supervisors and DoD [Standards of Conduct Office]
officials”; (2) “[t]hese actions, combined with his involvement in early Cloud Initiative activities in… 2017, also created the
appearance of violation of laws and ethical standards”; and (3) “[alas, because] Mr. Ubhi left the DoD on November 24,
2017,…disciplinary action regarding his misconduct is not available to the DoD.” DOD IG Report at 152, 157. But, while
most JEDI procurement aficionados were already familiar with Mr. Ubhi’s exploits and evasions, the report’s most surprising
twist was that there are even more conflicts! For example, the DOD IG Report at 10, 222 states:
Ms. Cummings, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition Enablers, violated her ethical requirements by improperly participating in a particular matter related to the JEDI procure-
ment while owning stock in Microsoft valued between $15,001 and $50,000.…[S]he participated and made recommendations in meet-
ings and briefings where participants evaluated options for either making substantive changes to the procurement or continuing as
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information it receives are its own business.” Vern also added helpful and informative history and addressed the more complex
issues related to creativity in proposal preparation, the nature of judgment in source selection, and the realities inherent in
protests (the adversarial byproduct of many debriefings). He offered the sobering observation that “none of the guidance or
regulations that we have reviewed, from past to present, instruct agencies to answer the three questions to which many unsuc-
cessful offerors will want ‘reasonable’ responses: (1) specifically, and in detail, how were we different from the winner?, (2)
specifically, and in detail, how was the winner better?, and (3) specifically, and in detail, how did you reason from what
premises to those conclusions?” Ultimately, Vern reminded the REPORT’S readers of his prior recommendation in Protest
Reform: We Dare To Dream, 27 NCRNL ¶ 51, which seems conceptually and pragmatically aligned with the enhanced
debriefing initiative, legislation, and policy, that agencies “retain and, during discussions and at the time of debriefing, give of-
ferors copies of all documentation of the evaluations of their own proposals, including the work papers and notes of individual
evaluators, properly collated. Every scrap of paper.” They also should “produce and distribute at the time of debriefing a chart
showing the top-level summary proposal ratings of all offerors and their proposed prices.” That makes sense.
Added Perspective: The DOD IG Report
On April 13, 2020, the Department of Defense Inspector General issued its lengthy report on the JEDI procurement report.
DODIG-2020-079, Report on the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) Cloud Procurement, https://www.dodig.mil/
reports.html/Article/2150471/report-on-the-joint-enterprise-defense-infrastructure-jedi-cloud-procurement-do/. At 313 pages,
and chock-full of conclusions that I expect will satisfy no one, it’s an extraordinary read. Veteran observer Jason Miller
opined: “By now Dana Deasy, the DoD [Chief Information Officer], or David Norquist, the DoD deputy secretary, should be
able to see that the time for JEDI has passed and the Pentagon should cut its losses and cancel the contract.” Time for DoD To
Cancel JEDI, Ride the CIA’s Cloud Coattails, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Apr. 13, 2020), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/reporters-
notebook-jason-miller/2020/04/time-for-dod-to-cancel-jedi-ride-the-cias-cloud-coattails/. He’s not alone in his perception.
The bulk of the media coverage of the report focused on the potential impact of presidential pressure to derail an award to
Amazon, leading to this seemingly inconsistent conclusion:
We sought to review whether there was any White House influence on the JEDI cloud procurement. We could not review this matter
fully because of the assertion of a “presidential communications privilege,” which resulted in several DoD witnesses being instructed by
the DoD Office of General Counsel not to answer our questions about potential communications between White House and DoD of-
ficials about JEDI. Therefore, we could not definitively determine the full extent or nature of interactions that administration officials
had, or may have had, with senior DoD officials regarding the JEDI Cloud procurement.
* * *
…[Nonetheless,] we believe the evidence we received showed that the DoD personnel who evaluated the contract proposals and
awarded Microsoft the JEDI Cloud contract were not pressured regarding their decision on the award of the contract by any DoD lead-
ers more senior to them, who may have communicated with the White House. [Emphasis added.]
DOD IG Report at 6–7. The IG also rehashes the litany of improper conflicts of interest that Judge Eric Bruggink chronicled
during the prior U.S. Court of Federal Claims protest, Oracle America, Inc. v. U.S., 144 Fed. Cl. 88 (2019), 61 GC ¶ 230. Not
surprisingly, Deap Ubhi, the former Product Manager for the Defense Digital Service, garners the most attention (consuming
approximately 10% of the lengthy report) and some of the most extensive redactions, leading to the IG’s conclusion that (1)
“Mr. Ubhi committed ethical violations when he lied, or failed to disclose information, on at least three occasions, in an effort
to conceal relevant information from, or mislead, his Amazon and DoD supervisors and DoD [Standards of Conduct Office]
officials”; (2) “[t]hes actions, combined with his involvement in early Cloud Initiative activities in… 2017, also created the
appearance of violation of laws and ethical standards”; and (3) “[alas, because] Mr. Ubhi left the DoD on November 24,
2017,…disciplinary action regarding his misconduct is not available to the DoD.” DOD IG Report at 152, 157. But, while
most JEDI procurement aficionados were already familiar with Mr. Ubhi’s exploits and evasions, the report’s most surprising
twist was that there are even more conflicts! For example, the DOD IG Report at 10, 222 states:
Ms. Cummings, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition Enablers, violated her ethical requirements by improperly participating in a particular matter related to the JEDI procure-
ment while owning stock in Microsoft valued between $15,001 and $50,000.…[S]he participated and made recommendations in meet-
ings and briefings where participants evaluated options for either making substantive changes to the procurement or continuing as
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planned with the ongoing proposal evaluations. Ms. Cummings participated even though Microsoft was one of two remaining competi-
tors for the pending JEDI Clod contract award…. [S]he should not have participated in those JEDI procurement activities.
* * *
Ms. Cummings’s actions violated ethical standards when she participated personally and substantially in a particular matter related to
the JEDI procurement while owning shares of Microsoft stock.…[Also,] Ms. Cummings participation in the JEDI procurement process
created the appearance of a violation of law or ethical standards.
The rep rt also painstakingly recou ts the DOD’s improp r disclosur of source selection and proprietary Micros ft infor-
mation to Amazon, plus the failure to properly redact DOD source selection team members’ names from the source selection
reports. This raises intriguing evidentiary issues for the pending COFC litigation, to the extent that the Judge Campbell-
Smith’s preliminary injunction order focused on the DOD’s errors in evaluating Microsoft’s price proposal, rather than an
improper evaluation of Amazon’s proposal. (“Had the DOD properly evaluated [Microsoft’s] proposal of [] storage in Price
Scenario 6,…the DOD would have concluded that the proposal was ‘noncompliant,’ and ‘should have found [its] technical ap-
proach unfeasible, assigned a deficiency, and eliminated [it] from the competition.’ ’’) Amazon Web Services, Inc. v. U.S., 147
Fed. Cl. 146, 153 (2020), 62 GC ¶ 72.
In highlighting manag m t and training failures that l d t th improper is losures, the DOD IG “recog ize[d] the chal-
lenges that the [Procuring Contracting Officer] faced on award day …, but she did n t fully review the disclosures, as she
should h ve.” DOD IG Report at 90. A post hoc legal and contr cting review “conclude that the decision t notify the unsuc-
cessful offeror and simulta eously provide a written d briefing for the strategic purpose of starting the protest clock im-
medi tely ‘created extraordinary pressure on the contracting team’ and did not allow for the proper amount f time that all the
tasks required [and] lso recommended [that] contracting leadership reexamine the use of written debriefs by default becaus
it was unlikely that the disclosure would h v occurred during an oral debri fing.” DOD IG Report at 87. But I digress.
Leadership And Debriefing Policy vs. Practice?
The DOD IG discussed the debriefing issue at length, confirming many of the allegations in Amazon’s original complaint.
See Complaint (redacted version) at 91–92, Amazon Web Services, Inc. v. U.S., No. 1:19-cv-01796-PEC (Fed. Cl. filed D c. 9,
2019). But th broader picture is that the debriefing-preparation rubric employed by th DOD at the conclusion of the JEDI
procurement has little in common with the aspiration of the enhanced debriefing initiative, best practices, or the common
justifications for the debriefing mandate. It also shines an unflattering light on the attorneys’ role in the process.
The report explains, at the highest levels of the DOD acquisition and information food chains, it was simply assumed that
there would be an oral debriefing. See DOD IG Report at 81, stating:
FAR 15.506 allows a contracting officer to conduct an oral or written debriefing. According to Mr. [Peter] Ranks, the Deputy CIO for
Information Enterprise, and the Cloud Computing Program Office (CCPO) Program Manager (PM), they expected the debriefing for
the unsuccessful contractor to be conducted orally, as did Mr. Deasy, the Chief Information Officer (CIO) and Ms. Lord, the Undersec-
retary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD[A&S]). Mr. Ranks told us that neither he, Mr. Deasy, nor Ms. Lord inquired
about how the debriefing would be conducted because, in their experience, an oral debriefing was standard practice for a contract of
this magnitude. The CCPM told us that she considered an oral debriefing a courtesy to the contractor, and both Mr. Ranks and the
CCPM told us that in their experience, an oral debriefing can de-escalate a contentious situation. [Emphasis added.]
The worm turns, however, when three attorneys “advised the PCO against conducting an oral debriefing,” which either led
the PCO to believe, or confirmed her belief, that an oral debriefing would neither de-escalate the situation nor reduce the risk
of protest. Indeed, one of the attorneys later explained to the IG that “in his opinion, oral debriefings are a bad idea ‘mainly
because of how parties in procurements of this size, magnitude, and publicity…don’t tend to use [an oral debriefing] in the
manner in which it’s intended. They tr[y] to trick the [PCO] and the Government [into] saying something they don’t mean, that
they can then use against [the Government] in litigation,’ which could jeopardize the contract award.” DOD IG Report at 81.
That seems antithetical to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy’s articulated debriefing best practices (as discussed in 34
NCRNL ¶ 10, citing Lesley A. Field, “Myth-busting 3”: Further Improving Industry Communication with Effective Debrief-
ings (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.ago.noaa.gov/acquisition/docs/ofpp_myth_busting_3.pdf). The DOD IG Report at 82
continues:
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planned with the ongoing proposal evaluations. Ms. Cummings participated even though Microsoft was one of two remaining competi-
tors for the pending JEDI Clod contract award…. [S]he should not have participated in those JEDI procurement activities.
* * *
Ms. Cummings’s actions violated ethical standards when she participated personally and substantially in a particular matter related to
the JEDI procurement while owning shares of Microsoft stock.…[Also,] Ms. Cummings participation in the JEDI procurement process
created the appearance of a violation of law or ethical standards.
The report also painstakingly recounts the DOD’s improper disclosure of source selection and proprietary Microsoft infor-
mation to Amazon, plus the failure to properly redact DOD source selection team members’ names from the source selection
reports. This raises intriguing evidentiary issues for the pending COFC litigation, to the extent that the Judge Campbell-
Smith’s preliminary injunction order focused on the DOD’s errors in evaluating Microsoft’s price proposal, rather than an
improper evaluation of Amazon’s proposal. (“Had the DOD properly evaluated [Microsoft’s] proposal of [] storage in Price
Scenario 6,…the DOD would have concluded that the proposal was ‘noncompliant,’ and ‘should have found [its] technical ap-
proach unfeasible, assigned a deficiency, and eliminated [it] from the competition.’ ’’) Amazon Web Services, Inc. v. U.S., 147
Fed. Cl. 146, 153 (2020), 62 GC ¶ 72.
In highlighting management and training failures that led to the improper disclosures, the DOD IG “recognize[d] the chal-
lenges that the [Procuring Contracting Officer] faced on award day …, but she did not fully review the disclosures, as she
should have.” DOD IG Report at 90. A post hoc legal and contracting review “concluded that the decision to notify the unsuc-
cessful offeror and simultaneously provide a written debriefing for the strategic purpose of starting the protest clock im-
mediately ‘created extraordinary pressure on the contracting team’ and did not allow for the proper amount of time that all the
tasks required [and] also recommended [that] contracting leadership reexamine the use of written debriefs by default because
it was unlikely that the disclosure would have occurred during an oral debriefing.” DOD IG Report at 87. But I digress.
Leadership And Debriefing Policy vs. Practice?
The DOD IG discussed the debriefing issue at length, confirming many of the allegations in Amazon’s original complaint.
See Complaint (redacted version) at 91–92, Amazon Web Services, Inc. v. U.S., No. 1:19-cv-01796-PEC (Fed. Cl. filed Dec. 9,
2019). But the broader picture is that the debriefing-preparation rubric employed by the DOD at the conclusion of the JEDI
procurement has little in common with the aspiration of the enhanced debriefing initiative, best practices, or the common
justifications for the debriefing mandate. It also shines an unflattering light on the attorneys’ role in the process.
The report explains, at the highest levels of the DOD acquisition and information food chains, it was simply assumed that
there would be an oral debriefing. See DOD IG Report at 81, stating:
FAR 15.506 allows a contracting officer to conduct an oral or written debriefing. According to Mr. [Peter] Ranks, the Deputy CIO for
Information Enterprise, and the Cloud Computing Program Office (CCPO) Program Manager (PM), they expected the debriefing for
the unsuccessful contractor to be conducted orally, as did Mr. Deasy, the Chief Information Officer (CIO) and Ms. Lord, the Undersec-
retary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD[A&S]). Mr. Ranks told us that neither he, Mr. Deasy, nor Ms. Lord inquired
about how the debriefing would be conducted because, in their experience, an oral debriefing was standard practice for a contract of
this magnitude. The CCPM told us that she considered an oral debriefing a courtesy to the contractor, and both Mr. Ranks and the
CCPM told us that in their experience, an oral debriefing can de-escalate a contentious situation. [Emphasis added.]
The worm turns, however, when three attorneys “advised the PCO against conducting an oral debriefing,” which either led
the PCO to believe, or confirmed her belief, that an oral debriefing would neither de-escalate the situation nor reduce the risk
of protest. Indeed, one of the attorneys later explained to the IG that “in his opinion, oral debriefings are a bad idea ‘mainly
because of how parties in procurements of this size, magnitude, and publicity…don’t tend to use [an oral debriefing] in the
manner in which it’s intended. They tr[y] to trick the [PCO] and the Government [into] saying something they don’t mean, that
they can then use against [the Government] in litigation,’ which could jeopardize the contract award.” DOD IG Report at 81.
That seems antithetical to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy’s articulated debriefing best practices (as discussed in 34
NCRNL ¶ 10, citing Lesley A. Field, “Myth-busting 3”: Further Improving Industry Communication with Effective Debrief-
ings (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.ago.noaa.gov/acquisition/docs/ofpp_myth_busting_3.pdf). The DOD IG Report at 82
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planned with the ongoing proposal evaluations. Ms. Cummings participated even though Microsoft was one of two remaining competi-
tors for the pending JEDI Clod contract award…. [S]he should not have participated in those JEDI procurement activities.
* * *
Ms. Cummings’s actions violated ethical standards when she participated personally and substantially in a particular matter related to
the JEDI procurement while owning shares of Microsoft stock.…[Also,] Ms. Cummings participation in the JEDI procurement process
created the appearance of a violation of law or ethical standards.
The report also painstakingly recounts the DOD’s improper disclosure of source selection and proprietary Microsoft infor-
mation to Amazon, plus the failure to properly redact DOD source selection team members’ names from the source selection
reports. This raises intriguing evidentiary issues for the pending COFC litigation, to the extent that the Judge Campbell-
Smith’s preliminary injunction order focused on the DOD’s errors in evaluating Microsoft’s price proposal, rather than an
improper evaluation of Amazon’s proposal. (“Had the DOD properly evaluated [Microsoft’s] proposal of [] storage in Price
Scenario 6,…the DOD would have concluded that the proposal was ‘noncompliant,’ and ‘should have found [its] technical ap-
proach unfeasible, assigned a deficiency, and eliminated [it] from the competition.’ ’’) Amazon Web Services, Inc. v. U.S., 147
Fed. Cl. 146, 153 (2020), 62 GC ¶ 72.
In highlighting management and training failures that led to the improper disclosures, the DOD IG “recognize[d] the chal-
lenges that the [Procuring Contracting Officer] faced on award day …, but she did not fully review the disclosures, as she
should have.” DOD IG Report at 90. A post hoc legal and contracting review “concluded that the decision to notify the unsuc-
cessful offeror and simultaneously provide a written debriefing for the strategic purpose of starting the protest clock im-
mediately ‘created extraordinary pressure on the contracting team’ and did not allow for the proper amount of time that all the
tasks required [and] also recommended [that] contracting leadership reexamine the use of written debriefs by default because
it was unlikely that the disclosure would have occurred during an oral debriefing.” DOD IG Report at 87. But I digress.
Leadership And Debriefing Policy vs. Practice?
The DOD IG discussed the debriefing issue at length, confirming many of the allegations in Amazon’s original complaint.
See Complaint (redacted version) at 91–92, Amazon Web Services, Inc. v. U.S., No. 1:19-cv-01796-PEC (Fed. Cl. filed Dec. 9,
2019). But the broader picture is that the debriefing-preparation rubric employed by the DOD at the conclusion of the JEDI
procuremen has little in c mmon with the aspiration of the enh nced debriefing nitiative, best practic s, or the common
justifications for the debriefing mandate. It also shines an unflattering light on the attorneys’ role in the process.
The report explains, at the highest levels of the DOD acquisition and information food chains, it was simply assumed that
there would be an oral debriefing. See DOD IG Report at 81, stating:
FAR 15.506 allows a c ntracting fficer to conduct an oral or written debriefing. According to Mr. [Peter] Ranks, the Deputy CIO for
Information Enterprise, and the Cloud Computing Program Office (CCPO) Program Manager (PM), they expected the debriefing for
the unsuccessful contractor to be conducted orally, as did Mr. Deasy, the Chief Information Officer (CIO) and Ms. Lord, the Undersec-
retary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD[A&S]). Mr. Ranks told us that neither he, Mr. Deasy, nor Ms. Lord inquired
about how the debriefing would be conducted because, in their experience, an oral debriefing was standard practice for a contract of
this magnitude. The CCPM t ld us that she considered an oral d b iefing a courtesy to the c ntractor, and both Mr. Ranks and the
CCPM told us that in their experience, an oral debriefing can de-escalate a contentious situation. [Emphasis added.]
The worm turns, however, when three attorneys “advised the PCO against conducting an oral debriefing,” which either led
the PCO to believe, or confirmed her belief, that an oral debriefing would neither de-escalate the situation nor reduce the risk
of protest. Indeed, one of the attorneys later explained to the IG that “in his opinion, oral debriefings are a bad idea ‘mainly
because of how parties in procurements of this size, magnitude, and publicity…don’t tend to use [an oral debriefing] in the
manner in which it’s intended. They tr[y] to trick the [PCO] and the Government [into] saying something they don’t mean, that
they can then use against [the Government] in litigation,’ which could jeopardize the contract award.” DOD IG Report at 81.
That seems antithetical to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy’s articulated debriefing best practices (as discussed in 34
NCRNL ¶ 10, citing Lesley A. Field, “Myth-busting 3”: Further Improving Industry Communication with Effective Debrief-
ings (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.ago.noaa.gov/acquisition/docs/ofpp_myth_busting_3.pdf). The DOD IG Report at 82
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planned ith the ongoing proposal evaluations. s. Cu ings participated even though icrosoft as one of t o re aining co peti-
tors for the pending JE I Clod contract a ard . [S]he should ot have participated in those JE I p cure ent activities.
* * *
s. Cu ings’s actions violated ethical standards hen she participated personally and substantially in a particular atter related to
the JE I procure ent hile o ning shares of icrosoft stock. [ lso,] s. Cu ings participation in the JE I procure ent process
created the appearance of a violation of la or ethical standards.
The report also painstakingly recounts the ’s i proper disclosure of source selection and proprietary icrosoft infor-
ation t azon, plus the failure to properly redact source selection tea e bers’ na es fro the source selection
reports. This raises intriguing evide tiary issues for th p nding F litigation, to the extent that the Judge a pbell-
S ith’s preli inary injunction order focused on the ’s errors in evaluating icrosoft’s price proposal, rather than an
i proper evaluation of azon’s proposal. (“ ad the properly evaluated [ icrosoft’s] proposal of [] storage in Price
Scenario 6, he ould have concluded that the proposal as ‘nonco pliant,’ and ‘should have found [its] technical ap-
proach unfeasible, assigned a d fici ncy, and eli i ated [it] fro the co pet ion.’ ’’) A zon eb Services, Inc. v. .S., 147
Fed. l. 146, 153 (2020), 62 ¶ 72.
In highlighting anage ent and training failures that led to the i proper disclosures, the I “recognize[d] the chal-
lenges that the [Procuring ontracting fficer] faced on a ard day , but she did not fully revie the disclosures, as she
should have.” I eport at 90. post hoc legal and contracting revie “concluded that the decision to notify the unsuc-
cessful offeror and si ultaneously provide a ritten debriefing for the strategic purpose of starting the protest clock i -
ediately ‘created extraordinary pressure on the contracting tea ’ and did not allo for the proper a ount of ti e that all the
tasks required [and] also reco ended [that] contracting leadership reexa ine the use of ritten debriefs by default because
it as unlikely that the disclosure ould have occurred during an oral debriefing.” I eport at 87. ut I digress.
Leadership nd ebriefing olicy vs. ractice?
The I discussed the debriefing issue at length, confir ing any of the allegations in azon’s original co plaint.
See o plaint (redacted version) at 91–92, A azon eb Services, Inc. v. .S., o. 1:19-cv-01796-PE (Fed. l. filed ec. 9,
2019). ut the broader picture is that the debriefing-preparation rubric e ployed by the at the conclusion of the JE I
procure ent has little in co on ith the aspiration of the enhanced debriefing initiative, best practices, or the co on
justifications for the debriefing andate. It also shines an unflattering light on the attorneys’ role in the process.
The report explains, at the highest levels of the acquisition and infor ation food chains, it as si ply assu ed that
there ould be an oral debriefing. See I eport at 81, stating:
F R 15.506 allo s a contracting officer to conduct an oral or ritten debriefing. According to r. [Peter] Ranks, the eputy CI for
Infor ation Enterprise, and the Cloud Co puting Progra ffice (CCP ) Progra anager (P ), they expected the debriefing for
the unsuccessful contractor to be conducted orally, as did r. easy, the Chief Infor ation fficer (CI ) and s. Lord, the ndersec-
retary of efense for Acquisition and Sustain ent ( S [A S]). r. Ranks told us that neither he, r. easy, nor s. Lord inquired
about ho the debriefing ould be conducted because, in their experience, an oral debriefing was standard practice for a contract of
this agnitude. The CCP told us that she considered an oral debriefing a courtesy to the contractor, and both r. Ranks and the
CCP told us that in their experience, an oral debriefing can de-escalate a contentious situation. [E phasis added.]
The or turns, ho ever, hen three attorneys “advised the P against conducting an oral debriefing,” hich either led
the P to believe, or confir ed her belief, that an oral debriefing ould neither de-escalate the situation nor reduce the risk
of protest. Indeed, one of the attorneys later explained to the I that “in his opinion, oral debriefings are a bad idea ‘ ainly
because of ho parties in procure ents of this size, agnitude, and publicity don’t tend to use [an oral debriefing] in the
anner in hich it’s intended. They tr[y] to trick the [P ] and the overn ent [into] saying so ething they don’t ean, that
they can then use against [the overn ent] in litigation,’ hich could jeopardize the contract a ard.” I eport at 81.
That see s antithetical to the ffice of Federal Procure ent Policy’s articulated debriefing best practices (as discussed in 34
L ¶ 10, citing Lesley . Field, “ yth-busting 3”: Further I proving Industry o unication ith Effective ebrief-
ings (Jan. 5, 2017), https:// .ago.noaa.gov/acquisition/docs/ofpp_ yth_busting_3.pdf). The I eport at 82
continues:
I I I 2020 | L 34 | I 5
71K 2020 ho son euters
FAR 15.506 states that to the maximum extent practicable, the Government has five days from the date of a contractor’s request for a
debriefing to provide the debriefing. In the weeks leading to the JEDI Cloud contract award, [one of the attorneys] advised the PCO to
notify the unsuccessful contractor and provide the written debriefing documents at the same time. The [attorney] told us, “When
conducting debriefings in accordance with the FAR, DFARS, and Class Deviation [2018-O0011]…it’s best for us to get [the informa-
tion] out immediately.”
All of this apparently led o a running debate between the PCO and th Program Manager, whic contin ed until after the
contract was awarded. As noted above, the DOD’s p st hoc review expressed skepticism with r gard to the strategic efficacy
of starting the protest clock im ediately by simultaneously delivering t e written debriefing with notice to the unsuccessful
offeror (and perceived that the strategy directly contributed to the improper disclosure of source selection information).
With regard to Amazon’s protest allegation that the DOD failed to respond to the 265 questions it submitted in response to
the written debriefing, the DOD IG Report at 88 explained:
[T]he ACO provided responses to questions that she determined were “relevant and within the scope of a debriefing.” Specifically, from
the 265 questions AWS submitted, the ACO did not respond to 139 questions. The ACO stated that 25 questions were outside the
debriefing scope, in accordance with FAR 15.506, and 114 questions were derived from the improper disclosure of Microsoft’s propri-
etary information and, therefore, also outside the scope of AWS’s debriefing.
Alas, iven the breadth of the IG’s data dump, the report reads like an unfinished novel r the first book in an ongoing
serial. The IG does not appear to have meaningfully examined Amazon’s allegation that “DoD did not provide a substantive
response to a single one of the 265 questions that AWS timely submitted, leaving AWS in the dark about DoD’s explanations
for the substantive issues for whic AWS raised concern.” (Emphasis ad ed.) Given the IG’s sp cific reference to DOD Cla s
Devia ion 2018-O0011, “Enhanced Po taward Debri fing Rights” (Mar 22, 2018), https://www.acq.o d.mil/dpap/policy/polic
yvault/USA000563-18-DPAP.pdf (DOD IG Report at 77 n.93), and its findings about h legal advice steering th acquisition
te m, that’s surpr sing. Wer the 126 “resp nses” t at the ACO did provide subs antive? Were the ACO’s responses formalistic
and unhelpful (and, thus, consistent with counsel’s pr r strategic advice), or did they supply additional information? At a min-
imum, did the ACO’s responses represent a good faith effort t point the disappointed offeror towards me ningf l informa-
tion?
The IG then appeared to lose interest in the DOD’s leadership’s role in the debriefing decision and process. When the Dep-
uty CIO Cloud Computing Program Office PM lost the debate with the PCO over the debriefing strategy, did he elevate the is-
sue? Did Mr. Deasy, the CIO, or Ms. Lord, the USD[A&S] push back? Frankly, who cares whether CIO Deasy and USD[A&S]
Lord “expected” an oral debriefing or assumed that to be “standard practice,” if, in the highest profile, hotly contested, and
intensely scrutinized procurement in the DOD’s acquisition portfolio, counsel and the PCO are doing exactly the opposite? It
strains credulity that this matter wasn’t aired prior to USD[A&S] Lord signing the Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)
that authorized the program office to award the JEDI Cloud contract on October 24, 2019, the day before the contract was
awarded. DOD IG Report at 224. Moreover, once CIO Deasy and USD[A&S] Lord learned about the written debriefing and
time crunch strategy, did they encourage the ACO to reconsider, provide an oral debriefing, or, at a minimum, urge the ACO to
be forthcoming in response to written questions? Looking ahead, does USD[A&S] Lord plan to issue policy guidance or les-
sons learned based upon the disconnect between policies, expectations, and practices?
Ultimately, the IG made no recommendations with regard to debriefings, whereas it had plentiful advice for the DOD with
regard to (1) policies to require some level of documentation and analysis supporting key acquisition decisions; (2) administra-
tive action against individuals for failing to review the redacted reports and attachments and disclosing proprietary, proposal,
and source selection information; (3) training for handling acquisition-related information not appropriate for disclosure; (4)
developing standard redaction policies; (5) action, including counseling and training for, individuals’ ethics violations; and (6)
procedures for identifying and mitigating potential conflicts of interest.
Is It Wrong To Do The Right Thing?
It’s not every day that the public is offered this level of detailed insight into an ongoing, high-profile procurement, including
voluminous factual recitations related to (some of) the issues pending in a (currently remanded) federal court bid protest. To
the extent the DOD IG added copious amounts of flesh to the bare bones of Amazon’s allegations, the picture the IG paints is
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no more attractive, and, arguably, even less so, than what we had been led to imagine. On the one hand, the DOD IG report
merely exposes an unfortunate anecdote of risk-averse attorneys eschewing transparency for tactical advantage. To the extent
that the anecdote involves the DOD’s highest-profile procurement, this suggests it’s not an under-the-radar, isolated example.
What’s more troubling is the stark disconnect between policy, aspiration, and leadership expectation, on the one hand, and
practice in the breach on the other.
All of which begs the question: Is it unrealistic to expect Government attorneys, in advising COs, to view contractors as
business partners rather than opponents to defeat or enemies to vanquish? What discourages Government attorneys from play-
ing the debriefing game to win, particularly in anticipation of protest litigation? Does the Government Accountability Office’s
longstanding refusal to scrutinize or police the Government’s debriefing obligations—as discussed at length in 34 NCRNL ¶
10—embolden Government counsel in crafting their advice.
This saga suggests it’s time for GAO to take a fresh look at its jurisdiction over debriefings. In 34 NCRNL ¶ 21, Vern
identified more than 3,600 GAO decisions, dating back to 1963, that mentioned debriefings. Yes, the GAO’s consistent mantra
is that debriefing is merely a procedural matter that does not affect the validity of the award. See, e.g., Reliability Sciences,
Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-212852, 84-1 CPD ¶ 493, 1984 WL 44181. Yet the FAR articulates the postaward debriefing
mandate dating back to the implementation of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355. See
FAR 15.506(a)(1) (emphasis added): “An offeror, upon its written request…shall be debriefed and furnished the basis for the
selection decision and contract award.” What’s the point of such a mandate, let alone a congressional “enhancement” of that
mandate, if there’s no enforcement mechanism?
What does it say about the defense acquisition system when the DOD’s senior leaders’ assumptions, consistent with best
practice, suggests an obvious solution, but the Government’s attorneys persuade the CO to do the opposite? Actions speak
louder than words (or policy guidance). What signal does the DOD’s behavior here send to the private sector? Nothing I read
in the DOD IG report assuaged my prior concerns that the DOD is blowing smoke with regard to enhanced debriefings. The
DOD may feel comfortable with their formalistic compliance with the FAR and Congress’ mandates in debriefing the JEDI
award, and they may ultimately overcome all protests to the JEDI procurement. But few readers of the DOD IG report will
come away with a perception that the DOD is a transparent, honest broker that respects its potential private sector partners or
values the private sectors’ (often significant) investment of resources in the source selection process. SLS
CONTRACTOR CLAIMS
¶ 27 POSTSCRIPT: CONSTRUCTIVE WAIVER OF
SPECIFICATIONS
Ralph C. Nash
In Constructive Waiver of Specifications: Coat of Many Colors, 6 N&CR ¶ 43, John Cibinic wrote a great analysis of the
decisions dealing with the issue of whether the Government had waived the requirements of clear, unambiguous specifications
based on actions on prior contracts and the same contract. He concluded that the following elements were necessary to prove
such a waiver: (1) the Contracting Officer had notice that the work differed from contract requirements; (2) actions or inac-
tions of the CO indicated that the non-specification performance was acceptable; (3) the contractor relied on the CO’s action or
inaction; and (4) it would be unfair to permit the Government to retract the waiver.
Decisions finding constructive waiver don’t happen very often, but there are two recent decisions worth considering.
Buck Town Contactors
In Buck Town Contractors & Co., ASBCA 60939, 20-1 BCA ¶ 37,486, 2019 WL 7403656, 62 GC ¶ 27, a subcontractor
built a levee using overlapping layers of geotextile material when the specifications called for continuous layers of the material
without seams. The board found that this was a clear failure to comply with the specifications but that the agency had
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FAR 15.506 states that to the maximum extent practicable, the Government has five days from the date of a contractor’s request for a
debriefing to provide the debriefing. In the weeks leading to the JEDI Cloud contract award, [one of the attorneys] advised the PCO to
notify the unsuccessful contractor and provide the written debriefing documents at the same time. The [attorney] told us, “When
conducting debriefings in accordance with the FAR, DFARS, and Class Deviation [2018-O0011]…it’s best for us to get [the informa-
tion] out immediately.”
All of this apparently led to a running debate between the PCO and the Program Manager, which continued until after the
contract was awarded. As noted above, the DOD’s post hoc review expressed skepticism with regard to the strategic efficacy
of starting the protest clock immediately by simultaneously delivering the written debriefing with notice to the unsuccessful
offeror (and perceived that the strategy directly contributed to the improper disclosure of source selection information).
With regard to Amazon’s protest allegation that the DOD failed to respond to the 265 questions it submitted in response to
the written debriefing, the DOD IG Report at 88 explained:
[T]he ACO provided responses to questions that she determined were “relevant and within the scope of a debriefing.” Specifically, from
the 265 questions AWS submitted, the ACO did not respond to 139 questions. The ACO stated that 25 questions were outside the
debriefing scope, in accordance with FAR 15.506, and 114 questions were derived from the improper disclosure of Microsoft’s propri-
etary information and, therefore, also outside the scope of AWS’s debriefing.
Alas, given the breadth of the IG’s data dump, the report reads like an unfinished novel or the first book in an ongoing
serial. The IG does not appear to have meaningfully examined Amazon’s allegation that “DoD did not provide a substantive
response to a single one of the 265 questions that AWS timely submitted, leaving AWS in the dark about DoD’s explanations
for the substantive issues for which AWS raised concern.” (Emphasis added.) Given the IG’s specific reference to DOD Class
Deviation 2018-O0011, “Enhanced Postaward Debriefing Rights” (Mar 22, 2018), https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/polic
yvault/USA000563-18-DPAP.pdf (DOD IG Report at 77 n.93), and its findings about the legal advice steering the acquisition
team, that’s surprising. Were the 126 “responses” that the ACO did provide substantive? Were the ACO’s responses formalistic
and unhelpful (and, thus, consistent with counsel’s prior strategic advice), or did they supply additional information? At a min-
imum, did the ACO’s responses represent a good faith effort to point the disappointed offeror towards meaningful informa-
tion?
The IG then appeared to lose interest in the DOD’s leadership’s role in the debriefing decision and process. When the Dep-
uty CIO Cloud Computing Program Office PM lost the debate with the PCO over the debriefing strategy, did he elevate the is-
sue? Did Mr. Deasy, the CIO, or Ms. Lord, the USD[A&S] push back? Frankly, who cares whether CIO Deasy and USD[A&S]
Lord “expected” an oral debriefing or assumed that to be “standard practice,” if, in the highest profile, hotly contested, and
intensely scrutinized procurement in the DOD’s acquisition portfolio, counsel and the PCO are doing exactly the opposite? It
strains credulity that this matter wasn’t aired prior to USD[A&S] Lord signing the Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)
that authorized th program office to award the JEDI Cloud contract on Oct ber 24, 2019, the day before the contract was
awarded. DOD IG Report at 224. Moreover, once CIO Deasy and USD[A&S] Lord learned about the written debriefing and
time crunch strategy, did they encourage the ACO to reconsider, provid an oral debriefing, or, at a minimum, urge the ACO to
be forthcoming in response to written questions? Looking ahead, does USD[A&S] Lord plan to i sue policy gui ance or les-
sons learned based upon t disconn c between policies, expectations, and practices?
Ultimately, the IG made no recommendations with regard to debriefings, whereas it had plentiful advice for the DOD with
regard to (1) policies to require some level of documentation and analysis supporting key acquisition decisions; (2) administra-
tive action against individuals for failing to review the redacted reports and attachments and disclosing proprietary, proposal,
and source selection information; (3) training f r handling acquisition-related information not ap ropriate for disclosure; (4)
developing standard redaction p ic es; (5) action, including counseling and training for, indivi uals’ ethic violations; and (6)
proc dures for i entifying and mitigating potential conflicts of intere t.
Is It Wrong To Do The Right Thing?
It’s not every day that the public is offered this level of detailed insight into an ongoing, high-profile procurement, including
voluminous factual recitations related to (some of) the issues pending in a (currently remanded) federal court bid protest. To
the extent the DOD IG added copious amounts of flesh to the bare bones of Amazon’s allegations, the picture the IG paints is
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15.506 states that to the axi u extent practicable, the overn ent has five days fro the date of a contractor’s request for a
debriefing to provide the debriefing. In the eeks leading to the J I loud contract a ard, [one of the attorneys] advised the to
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conducting debriefings in accordance ith the , , and lass eviation [2018- 0011] it’s best for us to get [the infor a-
tion] out i ediately.”
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FAR 15.506 states that to the maximum extent practicable, the Government has five days from the date of a contractor’s request for a
debriefing to provide the debriefing. In the weeks leading to the JEDI Cloud contract award, [one of the attorneys] advised the PCO to
notify the unsuccessful contractor and provide the written debriefing documents at the same time. The [attorney] told us, “When
conducting debriefings in accordance with the FAR, DFARS, and Class Deviation [2018-O0011]…it’s best for us to get [the informa-
tion] out immediately.”
All of this apparently led to a running debate between the PCO and the Program Manager, which continued until after the
contract was awarded. As noted above, the DOD’s post hoc review expressed skepticism with regard to the strategic efficacy
of starting the protest clock immediately by simultaneously delivering the written debriefing with notice to the unsuccessful
offeror (and perceived that the strategy directly contributed to the improper disclosure of source selection information).
With regard to Amazon’s protest allegation that the DOD failed to respond to the 265 questions it submitted in response to
the written debriefing, the DOD IG Report at 88 explained:
[T]he ACO provided responses to questions that she determined were “relevant and within the scope of a debriefing.” Specifically, from
the 265 questions AWS submitted, the ACO did not respond to 139 questions. The ACO stated that 25 questions were outside the
debriefing scope, in accordance with FAR 15.506, and 114 questions were derived from the improper disclosure of Microsoft’s propri-
etary information and, therefore, also outside the scope of AWS’s debriefing.
Alas, given the breadth of the IG’s data dump, the report reads like an unfinished novel or the first book in an ongoing
serial. The IG does not appear to have meaningfully examined Amazon’s allegation that “DoD did not provide a substantive
response to a single one of the 265 questions that AWS timely submitted, leaving AWS in the dark about DoD’s explanations
for the substantive issues for which AWS raised concern.” (Emphasis added.) Given the IG’s specific reference to DOD Class
Deviation 2018-O0011, “Enhanced Postaward Debriefing Rights” (Mar 22, 2018), https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/polic
yvault/USA000563-18-DPAP.pdf (DOD IG Report at 77 n.93), and its findings about the legal advice steering the acquisition
team, that’s surprising. Were the 126 “responses” that the ACO did provide substantive? Were the ACO’s responses formalistic
and unhelpful (and, thus, consistent with counsel’s prior strategic advice), or did they supply additional information? At a min-
imum, did the ACO’s responses represent a good faith effort to point the disappointed offeror towards meaningful informa-
tion?
The IG then appeared to lose interest in the DOD’s leadership’s role in the debriefing decision and process. When the Dep-
uty CIO Cloud Computing Program Office PM lost the debate with the PCO over the debriefing strategy, did he elevate the is-
sue? Did Mr. Deasy, the CIO, or Ms. Lord, the USD[A&S] push back? Fr nkly, who cares whether CIO Deasy and USD[A&S]
Lord “expected” an oral debriefing or assumed that to be “standard practice,” if, in the highest profile, hotly contested, and
intensely scrutinized procurement in the DOD’s acquisition portfolio, counsel and the PCO are doing exactly the opposite? It
strai s credulity that this matter wasn’t aired prior to USD[A&S] Lord signing the Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)
that authorized the program office to award the JEDI Cloud contract on October 24, 2019, the day before the contract was
awarded. DOD IG Report at 224. Moreover, once CIO Deasy and USD[A&S] Lord learned about the written debriefing and
time crunch strategy, did they encourage the ACO to reconsider, provide an oral debriefing, or, at a minimum, urge the ACO to
be forthcoming in response to written questions? Looking ahead, does USD[A&S] Lord plan to issue policy guidance or les-
sons learned based upon the disconnect between policies, expectations, and practices?
Ultimately, the IG made no recommendations with regard to debriefings, whereas it had plentiful advice for the DOD with
regard to (1) policies to require some level of documentation and analysis supporting key acquisition decisions; (2) administra-
tive action against individuals for failing to review the redacted reports and attachments and disclosing proprietary, proposal,
an source selection information; (3) training for handling acquisition-related information not appropriate for disclosure; (4)
developing st ndard redaction po icies; (5) action, including couns li and training for, individuals’ ethics violations; and (6)
procedures for identifying and mitigating potential conflicts of interest.
Is It Wrong To Do The Right Thing?
It’s not every day that the public is offered this level of detailed insight into an ongoing, high-profile procurement, including
voluminous factual recitations related to (some of) the issues pending in a (currently remanded) federal court bid protest. To
the extent the DOD IG added copious amounts of flesh to the bare bones of Amazon’s allegations, the picture the IG paints is
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